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Summary findings
De Gregorio reviews the theory and evidence on  output growth. An independent central bank can be
inflation and growth and provides additional empirical  effective in reducing inflation if the public perceives that
evidence for a large cross-section of countries.  it is tough on inflation. But inflation persists because the
The evidence, he reports, suggests a robust negative  cost of reducing it is high - the most evident cost being
relationship between inflation and growth. He argues  the loss of output from disinflation.
that inflation limits growth mainly by reducing the  De Gregorio concludes that although serious progress
efficiency of investment rather than its level. But this  has been made in recent years in assessing empirically
finding is difficult to explain using traditional  theories  how central banks affect macroeconomic performance,
that rely on the effects of inflation on employment,  the results are still inconclusive. The empirical evidence
which are not supported  by the data. Explanations  shows a negative correlation  between inflation and
focusing on the effects of inflation on the allocation of  central bank independence, especially in OECD
talents and the functioninig of financial markets may help  countries, but the effects on growth are less conclusive. It
in understanding better the long-run relationship  is fair to say that the bulk of the evidence suggests that
between inflation and growth.  central bank independence produces lower inflation at
De Gregorio also reviews the theoretical and empirical  no real costs.
literature on how central banks affect inflation and
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For a long time  economists  have been studying  the  costs of inflation.'  For example,
it has been argued that  inflation is costly because it induces the public to hold insuf-
ficient amounts  of cash balances,  leading to  welfare losses.  This  has  been  the  basis
for Friedman's  proposal of zero nominal interest  rate (Friedman.  1969) to achieve full
liquidity.  It  has  also been stressed  the  effects of inflation  on increasing  uncertainty,
which affects adversely the public's  ability  to make their best  decisions.  Therefore,  a
reduction  of inflation may increase well being by reducing distortions.  More recently,
the static  losses alluded  above have been amplified by theoretical  models and  empir-
ical evidence that  show that  inflation  has also negative effects on the rate  of growth
of an  economy.
Since everybody would agree that  inflation is costly, it is then necessary to ask why
it is so difficult  to  achieve low inflation,  specially in situations  of extreme  inflation
where a lower level of inflation would be clearly beneficial. The straightforward  answer
is that  inflation  remains  high  because  it  is costly  to  reduce  it.  The  most  evident
cost  is  the  loss of output  stemming  from  a  disinflation.  The  existence  of sticky
prices  and  credibility  problems  are responsible  for the slow response  of the  private
sector  to  attempts  by the  authorities  to  reduce inflation,  and  consequently,  for the
output  losses associated  with  a reduction  of inflation  (see, e.g.,  De Gregorio,  1995).
Therefore,  it becomes crucial to  know how can those recessionarv  costs  be reduced.
This  task  requires,  among other  things,  to  understand  the  institutional  factors  that
affect inflation.  A substantial  body  of literature  has focused  on the  role of central
banks  in  increasing  credibility  and  reducing  the costs of achieving and  maintaining
low inflation.
This paper reviews the literature  on inflation, growth, and the effect of central bank
independence  on economic performance.  Theory suggests that  inflation affects growth
by reducing the rate of investment  as well as the efficiency of investment.  In reviewing
the existing  empirical evidence, which is complemented in this  paper with  additional
cross-country  growth  regressions,  special  emphasis  is placed  in  disentangling  both
channels  through  which inflation  affects growth.  It is also discussed  the importance
IA  classical  reference  on this topic  is  Fischer  and Modigliani  (1978).  For a recent  analysis  see Lucas  (1993),  Braun
(1994)  and  the survey  by Driffill, Mizon  and Ulph  (1990).
1of some outlier  countries  and some other  relevant econometric  issues.  The evidence
discussed  in this  paper indicates that  indeed inflation has a negative effect on growth
and it is mainly  due to a reduction  in the  productivity  of investment.  Although  high
inflations  are shown to be the most  harmful for growth,  it is found that  even in low-
inflation industrialized  countries there is a negative relationship between inflation and
growth.
Establishing  an  independent  central  bank  is an  effective tool  to  reduce  inflation
as long  as  the  public  perceive that  the  central  bank  is tough  against  inflation.  In
reviewing the  literature  this  paper  uses a framework that  incorporates  explicitly,  in
addition  to a central bank that  conducts monetary  policy, a fiscal authority  that  needs
to finance  the budget.  It is shown that  moving from a fully dependent  central bank  to
an  independent  central  bank with  more emphasis  on fighting inflation  than  society's
would like is welfare increasing.  But,  when the  central bank  places excessive weight
on  reducing  inflation  it  may induce  excessive output  fluctuations  and  inefficiencies
on  fiscal policy.  The  empirical  evidence shows that  there  is a negative  correlation
between  inflation  and  central  bank  independence,  specially in OECD  countries,  but
the  effects on growth  are less conclusive.  It  is fair to say, however, that  the  bulk  of
the  evidence suggests  that  central  bank independence  produces  lower inflation at  no
real costs.
The  paper  follows in four sections.  Section  2 discusses theories  of inflation  and
growth.  Then.  Section  3 dliscusses the  effects of central  bank  independence  on in-
flation  and  macroeconomic  performnance. Section  4 discusses the empirical  evidence
on inflation  and  growth, and then  on central  bank  independence and  macroeconomic
performance.  Finally, Section 5 summarizes  the  main conclusions.
2  How  does  Inflation  Affect  Economic  Growth?
In  this  section  I review the  theory  on inflation  and  long-run  growth.  In  the  short
run  inflation  is costly  and  entails  welfare losses,  but  I will ignore those  short  run
considerations.  However, it is important  to  note that  as long as inflation  has effects
on long-run  growth, the standard  static welfare losses from inflation may be magnified.
This  could add  significantly to current  estimations  of the welfare losses of inflation.
22.1  The  neoclassical  approach
In their  classical  articles  Mundell (1965) and  Tobin  (1965) predicted  a positive  cor-
relation  between  the  rate  of inflation  and  the  rate  of capital  accumulation.  The
Mundell-Tobin  effect relies on  the  substitutability  between  money  and  capital,  by
which an increase  in the rate  of inflation results  in an increase  in the cost of holding
money  and  a  portfolio  shift  from money to  capital.  This  change  in  portfolio  com-
position  brings  an increase in capital  accumulation  and  a decline in the  real interest
rate.  Finally,  the  increase  in the  rate  of capital  accumulation  induces a higher  rate
of growth.
The  main  criticism  to  the  Mundell-Tobin  effect is that  money is assumed  to  be
demanded  because it is a store of value. This assumption  seems to be implausible since
nowadays money is dominated  in rate  of return  by other  assets. 2 Indeed,  in modern
economies  is  unlikely  that  individuals  demand  money  to  save.  Instead,  money  is
demanded  because  it is necessary for transactions.  One could argue,  however, that
in  formerly  centrally  planned  economy individuals  use  money to  save, and  in  fact,
a  reason  for  the  so-called  monetary  overhang  is that  households  only  way to  save
is holding money.  However, in  those economies  people use money to  save precisely
because the possibility  to save in  "capital" is not available, due to the lack of financial
markets,  and  therefore  money is the only store of value and  inflation cannot  produce
a  portfolio  shift.  The  development  of capital  markets,  rather  tlhan an  increase  in
inflation,  will induce  a shift  from money to capital.
Most  of the  subsequent  literature  in  the  neoclassical  tradition  follows the  semi-
nal work of Sidrauski  (1967) in the context  of an infinitely-lived representative  agent
model  where  money is denmanded because  it  provides  utility.  In Sidrauski's  model
money  is superneutral,  that  is the  rate  of money growth  has  no real  effect on  the
steady  state.  Subsequent  work, however, extended  the model to show that  superneu-
t.rality is a rather  special  case, and  in most  general cases inflation would reduce  the
steady-state  stock of capital,  thus resulting in a reversal of the Mundell-Tobin effect. 3
For example,  this  may  result  from  the  fact  that  money  provides  liquidity  services
by freeing resources  and  output  that  otherwise  would  be devoted  to  sustaining  the
2This  criticism  was first raised  by Levhari and  Patinkin  (1968).
3For further analysis  see  the  survey  by Orphaniades  and  Solow  (1990)
3exchange system  (Dornbusch  and  Frenkel, 1975). This  may also result  from changes
in the labor supply when leisure is introduced  as an additional  argument  in the utility
function  (Brock,  1974).  Another  relevant case is when money is used as an input  in
the production  process (Fischer,  1983), or finally, when money is used to buy capital
goods (Stockman,  1981). In all of these models money and capital  can be interpreted
as being complements.4
Most of the  literature  discussed  so far  focuses on  the  effects of inflation  on the
steady  state  level  of output.  There  is  usually  no effects on  the  steady  state  rate
of  growth,  since  the  models  are  framed  in  the  context  of economies  that  do  not
display  permanent  growth.  Indeed  in the  traditional  literature  the  only  source  of
growth  is  the  exogenous  rate  of productivity  growth,  which  cannot  be  affected  by
policy.  It  was not  until  developments  in the  theory  of economic growth  allowed to
understand  how economies  may endogenously  display  permanent  growth  that  the
neoclassical  framework  was extended  to  incorporate  the  effects of inflation  in  long
run  growth.  Recently, De Gregorio (1993) and  Jones and Manuelli  (1993) have used
the endogenous  growth  framework to extend  the  results  from the  effects of inflation
on per capita  output  to the  effects of inflation on the rate  of growth of output.
To understand  how inflation  affects long-run  growth  consider  the  following pro-
duction  function:5
y7t =  Of(kt,  X t)  (l)
where  t  is output  atr period  t.  0  is a technological parameter.  and  k,  and  e, are the
stock  of capital  and  employment  in  period  t,  respectively.  After  log-differentiating
(1) we obtain  the  following expression  for the  rate of growth  of the economy:
- = Of'(ktt Ct)I  (2)
where -y is the rate  of growth of output  (-=d  log(yt)/dt),  Of'(kt, Ct) is the marginal
productivity  of capital,  and  i is the investment  rate,  (1/y)(dk/ldt).  In the traditional
growth  model  the  assumption  of decreasing  returns  to  capital  with  the  marginal
productivitv  of capital  going  to  zero as the  capital  stock  grows  to  infinity  ensures
41n a different  framework  NIcKinnon  (1973,  ch.  5) argues  that  money  and  capital  are  complements  in  economies
with  underdeveloped  financial  markets.
51or simplicity  I assume  there  is no  depreciation.
4that  unless productivity  is assumed  to  grow (0 not. to be a constant)  there  is no per-
capita  output  growth  in  the steady  state.  In contrast,  the new endogenolus growth
models have focused in cases where f'(kt,  ft)  remains alwavs positive. 6 In this  type of
models it is no longer necessary that  some exogenous factor, such as 0, be the source
of output  growth.
Accordiing to equation  (2) growth may be generated  by either.  an  increase  in the
marginal  productivity  of capital  Of'(kt, et)  or an  increase in  the rate  of investment.
In  the  empirical  section  of this  paper  I  discuss  the  effects of inflation  on  growth
through  the two channels:  the  efficiency  channel to refer to the increase  in Of',  and
the  investment  channel to  refer to  the increase  in  i.  In endogenous  growth  models
capital  must  be interpreted  in broad  terms,  to include not  only physical capital,  but
also human  capital,  knowledge, organizational  capital,  etc., and  thus,  an  increase in
the rate  of investment  should  also include,  for example. the  rate  of accumulation  of
human  capital.
In  a closed-econonmy  investment  equals savings, and  the interaction  between  them
will also determine  the return  on capital.  The  Mundell-Tobin  effect focused on  the
impact  that  inflation  has on savings.  Through  a portfolio  shift,  inflation  would  in-
crease  the  rate  of savings, resulting  in an  increase in investment  and  growth,  and  a
decline in the real interest  rate.
In  contrast,  in models such  as  Stockman  (1981). De Gregorio  (1993) and  Jones
and  Manuelli  (1993) inflation affects growth  because it reduces the  investment  rate.
Inflation can be considered to be a tax on investment, and therefore would increase the
profitability  requiredI to undertake  an investment, project  and  woluld reduce  the  real
interest  rate  relevant for savings.  In Stockman  (1981) and De Gregorio (1993) money
is required  to buy capital  goods. and hence the effective cost of capital  increases with
the inflation  rate.  Jones and Manuelli  (1993) assume that  there  is a nominal  rigidity
in the  tax  structure.  Specifically they  assume  that  the tax  code includes  nominally
denominated  tax allowances. 7 The result of this imperfection is that  as inflation rises
6Among  the  leading  examples  see  Romer  (1986),  Lucas  (1988),  Jones  and  Manuelli  (1990)  and  Rebelo  (1991).
More  involved  specifications  that  emphasize  the  role of innovation,  creation  of new  products  and  quality  ladders  can
be found  in  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991)  and  Aghion  and  Howitt  (1992).
71t  could  also  be  assumed  that  tax  brackets  are  imperfectly  indexed  or  nominally  denominated  investment  tax
credits.
5tax allowances decline, and consequently  the  effective cost of investment  increases.
Another  mechanism through  inflation could affect growth is bv distorting  the op-
timal  choice  between  consumption  and  leisure  (De  Gregorio,  1993).  In  this  case
individuals'  decisions, rather  than  that  of firms, affects negatively  growth.  To illus-
trate  this  effect note that  equation  (2) shows that  a  decline in J''(k,  et)  results  in  a
decline in the rate of growth, because capital  accumulation  becomes less efficient. For
simplicity  assume  that  f  is linear  in k, and  therefore  f'  is an  increasing  function  of
et. Finally, consider the case where individuals  have to choose between consumption
and  leisure,  and  to  purchase consumption  goods  individuals  face a cash-in-advance
constraint.  Therefore  the  effective price of consumption  goods will include  the rate
of inflation,  like  a  tax,  since individuals  will have to  hold  money in  order  to  buy
consumption  goods.  Therefore,  an increase  in the  rate  of inflation will increase  the
price of consumption  with respect  to the  price of leisure inducing substitution  from
consumption  to  leisure,  thereby  reducing  the  labor  supply.  Hence,  an  increase  in
inflation  will reduce  the efficiency of investment  (Of') and  the rate  of growth.
2.2  Reinterpreting  the  neoclassical  approach
In  the  neoclassical  approach  anticipated inflation  has  negative effects on growth  by
changing  money  demand  of consumers  and  firms.  This  may of course  be  narrow,
specially  given the  (legree of sophistication  of financial  markets.  which presumably
offer  a  wide  range  of instruments  to  hedge  against  anticipated  inflation.  Further-
more, in modern  economies it is unlikely that  most of purchases  of capital  goods are
conducted  with  nmoniey  rather  than  with  credit.  For these  reasons it is important  to
broaden  the  interpretation  of the models to include  more realistic situations.  Instead
of assuming  simply that  money is used to buy  capital  goods, one can think  more in
general  that  money facilitates the operation  of a firm.  High inflation may lead to ex-
cessive (nonmonetary)  resources being devoted to transactions  and cash-management
instead  of the production  of goods and innovation.  Firms are also subject to enormous
capital  gains  or losses in countries  where chronically  high inflation  exists.  This  in-
duces entrepreneurs  to spend a considerable amount  of time and resources in portfolio
management.
Analogously,  the variable  e can  be interpreted  more broadly  as effort exerted  in
6the production  of goods. In a high inflation economy households also spend resources
in protecting  themselves  against inflation, and in finding arbitrage  opportunities  that
arise in unstable  macroeconomic environments.  Therefore, one can think of the effect
of inflation  on  labor  supply  as a  simplification  for the  effects of inflation  on effort
devoted  by workers while performing  productive  activities.
Overall,  inflation  provides  an incentive  for firms  and  households  to  devote  more
resources to  activities  that  are not  the engines to  sustained  growth.  This point  has
been stressed  by Baumol  (1990) and  Murphy, Shleifer and  Vishny (1991), who argue
that  the  allocation  of talent  is an  important  explanation  for growth  performance.
And the allocation  of talent  is strongly  influenced by institutional  factors, such as the
macroeconomic  environment,  which determine the  relative rewards for the allocation
of resources in activities  with different social returns.  Leijonhufvud  (1977) has specif-
ically argued  that  in an  inflationary  environment  becomes  more important  to  cope
with inflation  rather  than  devote time to  'real'  activities:
"Being  efficient and  competitive  at  the  production  and  distribution  of
'real'  goods and  services becomes less important  to  the real outcome of so-
cioeconomic activity.  Forecasting inflation and coping with its consequences
becomes more important.  People will reallocate  their  effort and  ingenuity
accordingly  ...
In short,  being good at 'real'  productive activities-being  competitive in
the  ordinary  sense-no  longer has the same priority.  Plaving  the inflation
right is vital."
2.3  Inflation,  uncertainty  and  investment
It is part  of the conventional  wisdom that  inflation increases uncertainty  in the econ-
omy, and this  uncertainty  is harmful for investment and growth.  Let consider first the
link between inflation and  uncertainty,  and then turn  to the link between uncertainty
and  investment.
First,  most  econonmists would argue that  high  anticipated  inflation  is associated
with high variability  of unexpected  inflation, that  is, the uncertainty  about  inflation
rises with  the  level of inflation.8 Therefore,  individuals  willing to  forecast  future
8For  a recent  discussion  and  comprehensive  review of the  literature  see  Ball  and  Cecchetti  (1990).  See also  Ungar
7macroeconomic  conditions  will find more problems in a  high inflation  environment.
However, not  only uncertainty  about  inflation rises, but  also relative  price variability
also  increases  with  inflation.  Most  of the  existing  empirical  evidence  shows that
the  variability  of prices  across  goods and  the  variability  of prices  of a same  good
across stores increase with the rate of inflation.9 As a consequence, the informational
content  of prices declines  with  inflation since current  prices  are a  poor  predictor  of
future  prices.
The higher uncertainty  generated  by high inflation has important  implications  for
welfare.  In particular,  models based  on search theory emphasize  (see, e.g., Benabou,
1988; Casella  and  Feinstein,  1992; and  Tommasi,  1993) the  distortionary  effects of
inflation  that  changes  the  search  intensity  of individuals  and  the  monopoly  power
of firms.  Although  these welfare effects are extremely  important,  they  will not  be
discussed further  since our interest  is on the  growth effects of inflation,  rather  than
its static  welfare costs.
Also, overall uncertainty  about  macroeconomic policy certainly  increases with  in-
flation.  Fischer  (1991) has supported  this view by arguing that  inflation is an  "indica-
tor of the overall ability of the government to manage the economy."  And he concludes
that  "since there  are no good arguments  for high inflation  rates,  a  government  that
is producing  high inflation is a government that  has lost control."  Therefore,  in high
inflation  econonmies  the  government  will be  more prone  to  introduce  price  controls,
changes in the tax and  trade  regime, etc.  all of which increase uncertainty  about  the
future,  thereby  affecting investment  decisions.
The  next  question  is how does uncertainty  affect investment.  In  this  respect  the
theoretical  literature  has made  significant  progress in recent  years  in analyzing  the
relationship  between uncertainty  and investment.  Initially, Hartman  (1972), and later
Abel (1983), showed that  in an economy without  frictions  an increase in uncertainty
about  prices would increase  investment.  The reason  is that  under  constant  returns
to scale the marginal  profitability  of capital is a convex function  of input  and output
prices.  Therefore,  by  Jensen's  inequality,  an  increase  in  uncertainty  about  prices,
would  increase  the  expected  marginal  return  on  capital,  and  hence  would  induce
and  Zilberfarb  (1993),  who  find  that  there  is  a threshold  effect  by  which  uncertainty  increases  with  inflation  in high
inflation  episodes,  and  this  link  is  weaker  at  low inflation.
9See  Lach  and  Tsiddon  (1992)  and  references  therein.
8an increase  in investment.  However, the  recent  literature  on irreversible  investment
has shown  how this  relationship  can be reversed." 0 The  fact that  investment  is irre-
versible, that  is roughly once a machine has been put in place it has no alternative  use
(and  therefore  no resale value), implies an additional  opportunity  cost of investment
stemming  from value  of waiting  while new  information  is revealed,  which  is called
the  option  value of investment.  When  investment  is irreversible  it  can  be  consid-
ered equivalent  to  exercising  a call  option.  A call option,  as well as an  irreversible
investment  project,  can be exercised,  but  once it is exercised it has no value.
When investment  is irreversible firms will not invest until the marginal cost of cap-
ital  is equal  to its marginal  profitability  but  they will require additional  profitability
to compensate  for bad  shocks in  which case they  could end  up with  too  much cap-
ital.  Now we can analyze  what  happens  with  an  increase  in uncertainty.  Consider
a  project  that  has  a random  return.  When  uncertainty  increases  it  is more  likely
that  there  will be  more  good and  bad  outcomes  in  the  future.  However only  bad
outcomes  matters  since it is more likely that  the investment  project  turns  out  to  be
unprofitable.  In contrast,  good outcomes  will only reassure  that  the  investment  has
been  profitable,  without  altering  the  firm's  decision.  This  is what  Bernanke  (1983)
has called  the  "bad  news principle  of irreversible investments,"  i.e.  "that  of possible
future  outcomes,  only unfavorable  ones have a  bearing on the  current  propensity  to
undertake  a given project."  This  has led many economists to  conclude  that  the  ir-
reversible  investment  literature  provides strong  support  to the idea that  uncertainty
is harmful  for investment  and  growth.  However. this  conclusion is not  general.  As
stressed  by  Caballero  (1993), although  an  increase  in  uncertainty  increases  the  re-
quired  return,  the  increase  in  uncertainty  also implies  that  extreme  realizations  of
the  return  on investment  will be  more likely to  occur,  and  therefore.  the  net effect
on investment  is ambiguous.  A way to insure  that  uncertainty  reduces investment  is
to  assume  that  investors have some degree of risk aversion, which adds  new costs to
increased  uncertainty.
Finally,  Aizenman  and  Marion  (1993) have emphasized the  different impact  that
persistence  and  uncertainty  of policies have on economic growth.  They  argue that  is
the interaction  between persistence  and uncertainty  what may be harmful  for growth.
°
0See  Bernanke  (1983),  McDonald  and Siegel  (1986),  Dixit  and Pindyck  (1993),  and Bertola  and  Caballero  (1994).
9The  higher the  persistence,  that  is the more likely a bad  outcome will remain  in the
future,  the  higher  is the  impact  of uncertainty  on  investment  since the  decline  in
the  present  value  of investment  caused  by a  bad  shock is  higher  the  higher  is its
persistence.  Thus,  according to  the bad news principle the more persistent  the policy
the higher  the effects of uncertainty  on investment  and growth.
2.4  Financial  market  distortions
Recent  research  has  focused  on the  links  between  financial  markets  and  economic
growth  (e.g.,  King and  Levine,  1993).  However, an  area  that  lhas received less at-
tention  but  seems  to  be well-known by policymakers  are  the  effects of inflation  on
the  operation  of financial markets.  Thus,  if inflation reduces the  ability of financial
markets  to  perform  efficient financial  intermediation,  this  will constitute  an  addi-
tional  channel  through  which inflation  may be  harmful  for growth.  This  issue was
stressed  in the development context  by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) who argue
in  favor  of a  stable  price level for developing  countries  in order  to  induce  financial
intermediation,  in particular  the development  of long term  contracts.
Most of the  recent literature  on this topic emphasizes the fact that  in world of im-
perfect  information,  the informational  problems may be exacerbatedl at high inflation
rates.  affecting the efficiency with  which credit  is allocated,  and  the total  volume  of
intermediation.  Azariadis  and  Smith  (1993) present  a model  where households  can
hold  deposits,  which are subject  to  inflation tax  and  are intermedliated  by banks,  or
alternatively,  they can hold unintermediated  assets (e.g., storage).  There  are also two
types  of borrowers, those who use credit  to produce capital  goods ("legitimate")  and
those  who obtain  credit,  convert it in storage  and  do not  repay ("illegitimate").  To
avoid  the  adverse selection  problems  banks  offer contracts  such  that  "'illegitimate"
borrowers  have  no incentives to  misrepresent  their  type.  Wheii  they  are  detected,
they  work and  become depositors.  However, as inflation  rises the incentives  to  hold
deposits  decline,  and hence, inducing  full revelation  requires to  penalize  more to  le-
gitimate  borrowers, so illegitimate ones have no incentives to misrepresent  their  type.
Within  this framework Azariadis and Smith (1993) conclude that  at low rates of infla-
tion  the  Mundell-Tobin  effect holds since there  is no problems of misrepresentation.
However,  at  high  inflation  rates  the  tightened  restrictions  to  induce  full revelation
10reduce capital  accumulation  of legitimate  borrowers  and the  Mundell-Tobin  effect is
reverted.
McKinnon  (1991) argues  that  moral  hazard  problems  in the  banking  sector  also
increase  with  infiation.  The moral  hazard  problem  stems  from the  fact  that  banks
may get involved in highly risky lending-such  as that  in Argentina  and Chile in the
1970s-when  they  perceive that  losses will be  covered by the  monetary  authorities.
In contrast  they receive the full benefits of favorable outcomes.  In a stable macroeco-
nomic environment  there is no covariance in the probability  of default across projects.
However, macroeconomic  instability  induces high  covariance in default  rates,  which
coupled  with  poor  financial  regulation  will induce  banks  to  increase  their  interest
rates,  lending  to  more risky  projects  (as in Stiglitz  and  Weiss 1981) and  increasing
the overall fragility  of the financial system.
Finally,  De Gregorio  and  Sturzenegger  (1994) also stress  the informational  prob-
lems induced by inflation in the operation  of financial markets.  They present a model
with two types  of firms.  One type is less productive  and has a positive probability  of
default,  while the  other  is more productive  and does  not default.  A central  element
of the  model is that  inflation increases the similarity  between the two types  of firms.
This could occur because the productivity  of safe firms declines with inflation, or, due
to higher search costs, the demand  faced by low-productivity  firms increases relative
to  that  of high-productivity  firms.  When inflation  is low, a fully revealing equilib-
rium  prevails,  in  which  banks  can  perfectly  identifv  each  type  of firm.  However,
as inflation  rises,  low-productivity  firms have more  incentives  to  appear  like high-
productivity  firms since the costs of mimicking their  behavior  declines.  At the  same
time,  high-productivity  firms have less incentives to signal their type,  since signaling
costs increase  with  inflation.  Thus,  high inflation  may induce a  pooling equilibrium
in which banks are unable to distinguish between the two types of firms, lending more
to low-productivity  firms and  less to high-productivity  firms than  in a fully revealing
equilibrium.
113  On  the  Sources  of  Inflation  and  the  Role  of  the  Central
Bank
To study  the sources of inflation,  there are mainly two (complementary)  approaches.
The first approach  analyzes  inflation in the context  of public finance, where inflation
is related  to  the  financing  of the  budget.  The  second  approach  considers  inflation
as an  instrument  that  is used to  exploit  a short-run  trade-off  between  inflation  and
unemployment  in order to reduce macroeconomic fluctuations.  This section integrates
both  approaches  and  discusses the role of a central bank  in controlling  inflation and
whether  it may contribute  positively to overall economic performance."
3.1  The  case  for  an  independent  central  bank
In  the  short  run  inflation  surprises  induce  booms  in  output.  This  is the  underly-
ing assumption  in the  modern  versions of the Phillips  curve, in  which, due  to  price
stickiness or informational  problems, an unanticipated  inflationary  shock reduces real
wages and  expands  output  and  employment  beyond their  full employment  level.
Governments,  in turn,  may have an output  target  above full employment  because
the full employment  level of output,  because the latter  may be considered  to be  too
low.  This  may  happen,  for example,  because  the  existence  of distortionary  taxes
reduces equilibrium  output,  or because monopoly power in goods and labor  markets
induces under-production.  Therefore.  the government  may have an  incentive to  cre-
ate  inflation  surprises  to  drive output  to  its  desired  level.  However, in  a  world of
rational  expectations  private  agents  will realize  about  these  intentions,  and  hence,
these  incentives will be taken  into  account  by the private  sector when  setting  infla-
tionary  expectations  and  negotiating  wages, so-unless  the government  has superior
information-inflationary  surprises  cannot  occur  . This  is the  key insight  from  the
seminal  work by Kydland  and  Prescott  (1977) and  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983).  This
framework can be used to understand  why there is inflation and how an independent
central  bank  may help to  achieve lower inflation.
To  explain  the  main  insights  from  this  theory  I  present  a  summarized  version
of Barro  and  Gordon  (1983).  Suppose that  a policymaker  dislikes inflation  (ir) and
"For  further discussions  on central  bank  independence  see  Cukierman  (1992)  and  Walsh (1993).
12deviations  of output  from its desired level. The target  level of output  is y*+,r, where y*
is output  when unemployment  is at its natural  rate (or also called the noninflationary
rate)  and  r  is a distortionary  tax,  which reduces full employment  output  below the
socially optimum.  The loss function  of the government is:
72  6
L =-  +  -(Y  - y*  r)  (3)
where  the  parameter  6 represents  the  relative  aversion  to  output  deviations  with
respect  to inflation.  A low value of 6 represents low tolerance  to inflation,  and  hence
1/6  may be called inflation aversion.
The level of output  is determined  by the following Phillips curve:
y - =  ir - 7re  (4)
where  7r' is expected  inflation,  and  for simplicity the slope of the Phillips  curve can
be set equal  to one.
The government decides ir taking 7re  as given. Solving the optimization  problem of
the government  (minimization  of (3) subject  to (4)) it can be shown that  the optimal
action  of the government,  given 7re, is:
7r  =  6  (  re  ,r)
1 +  15
Note that  the higher the distortion  (T-)  the higher is the rate  of inflation the  govern-
ment  wants  to  implement  to  produce  an  expansion  of output.  On the  other  hand.
the  higher is 7re the higher  is 7r to  induce output  above full employment.  However,
the  private  sector  cannot  be  surprised  since there  is no uncertainty.  Therefore,  in
equilibrium  7re  =  r. This  implies that  the equilibrium  rate of inflation is:
7r =  6T
and  consequently  y = y*.
In equilibrium,  there  is positive  inflation and output  is not different  from y*. This
is the basic time consistency problem, by which the fact that  the government  attempts
to create inflation surprises brings on inflation large enough to discourage the govern-
ment form engineering inflation surprises.  The loss would be lower if inflation were set
at zero, because  y =  y* anyway.  However, zero inflation cannot  be sustained  in equi-
librium.  If the  private  sector sets  7re =  0, the government would set ir =  6r/(1  + 6),
generating  an output  boom, and  hence it would be irrational  to  set 7re =  0.
13Although  (3) may represent  society's  preferences,  it may be beneficial to  achieve
lower inflation.  Here  is where  a conservative  central  banker  as proposed  by Rogoff
(1985) may be  a good solution to the time  consistency problem.  If 6 in (3) is substi-
tuted  by 6' <  6, the  inflation rate  would be lower, while output  would be the  same.
In the limit,  a central banker that  does not care about output  (6' = 0) would produce
zero inflation.  The  important  lesson form  this  analysis is that  society  may benefit
from  having a central  bank with  inflation aversion greater  than  1/6.
This constitutes  one of the basis for proposals  of central bank  independence with  a
clear mandate  to price stability.  Although  many central banks  also have as objective
the  achievement  of output  stability,  the  price stability  objective  (reinforced  beyond
society's  tolerance  for inflation)  would be the key to low inflation.
However, central  bank independence  is not  without  costs.  As Rogoff (1985) shows,
central  bank  independence  may  result  in excessive output  fluctuations.  The  frame-
work presented  here cannot address this issue since output  is always at its full employ-
ment  level.  However, one could add  a  shock to  the Phillips  curve, by which  output
could fluctuate  around  its full employment  level. For example, at the right hand  side
of equation  (4) a shock e could be added.  This shock could be, for example,  a terms
of trade  or a  productivity  shock.  The  shock  e is not  observed by individuals  when
setting  expectations,  and  only the  government  can observe  it before setting  policy.
Therefore,  inflation  could be  used  to  offset  the  shock.  For example,  a  positive  in-
flationary  surprise  when e is negative  could offset the recessionarv impact  of C. The
reaction  to  the  shock by  a  central  bank  with  low 6' will be  too  conservative,  and,
as a  consequence,  to achieve low inflation  there  may be an  insufficient reaction  to  a
bad  realization  of e.  Thus,  the design of an  independent  central  bank  will involve a
tradeoff  between  stability  and flexibility.  Several mechanisms  have been analyzed  in
the literature  to choose a socially acceptable  combination  between flexibility and sta-
bility  (Rogoff, 1985; Canzoneri,  1985; Lohmann,  1992; and  Garfinkel and  Oh,  1993).
Alternatively,  some recent  work by Persson  and  Tabellini  (1993) and  Walsh (1995)
have analyzed the problem of designing an independent  central bank from a principal-
agent  framework.  They focus on the  optimal  contract  with  the central  bank.  They
discuss the  role of imposing penalties  on the centtal  bank  conditional  on the state  of
the  economy, or the  role of central  bank  announcements  when penalties  cannot  be
14implemented. 12
Recently, Alesina and  Gatti  (1995) have argued that  although  a conservative cen-
tral  banker  may  not  offset  enough  "economic uncertainty,"  as  that  envisioned  by
Rogoff (1985), they may reduce "political uncertainty."  The reason is that  in a model
such as that  of Alesina (1987), the political  cycle may induce business cycle because
of the  uncertainty  about  election  outcomes.  An independent  central  bank,  insulated
from political  pressures,  may reduce the uncertainty  about  the future  course of mon-
etary  policy when  there  is a  change in government.  The  overall effect will depend
on the  relative  importance  of "political"  versus "economic" uncertainty.  Alesina and
Gatti  (1995) have stressed that  political considerations  may explain why the evidence
(reviewed below)  suggests  that  independent  central  banks  bring  low inflation  at  no
real costs.
In  Latin  American  economies, and  more in general  in high  inflation countries,  it
is difficult to think  that  the source of inflation are attempts  of the government create
inflation  surprises  in order  to boost  output.  Indeed, most  analysts  would argue that
at  the  heart  of the  inflationary  problem  there  is a  fiscal problem.'3 Therefore,  it is
important  to  analyze  the role of fiscal imbalance  on the sources of inflation and  the
role of central  banks.  This  is the issue addressed  in the next section.
3.2  Fiscal  policy  considerations
In  the  real  world the  game  played  to  determine  inflation  is more complicated.  A
relevant  complication  is to  include a fiscal authority  whose objectives  are to finance
government  spending  with a combination  of taxes and  inflation.  I adapt  a model due
to Alesina and Tabellini  (1987), later used by Debelle (1993) and Debelle and  Fischer
(1994), to discuss the interactions  among the monetary  and  fiscal authorities  and the
private  sector.
Consider  now that  society  also values government  spending  (g) to  be  around  an
optimal  level g*, so the loss functions is:
- ~  ~  . 2  6  pV*)
L =  2 + -(7-yF _  T)2  + P(g _ g*)2  (5)
2  2  2
1
2For reasons  of space  I will  not  discuss  the  contract-theory  approach  to  central  banking.  For further details  see
Fischer  (1995).
1
3 See, e.g.,  Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1993)  and  Vegh (1993).
15Output  is still determined  according to equation  (4). Government  spending is financed
through  taxes and  inflation,  that  is:
g=  1r  + T.  (6)
I will discuss  two different  institutional  arrangements:  the  centralized  case (su-
perscript  C),  in  which the  fiscal and  the monetary  authority  are the  same, and  the
decentralized  (superscript  D)  case,  in  which  the  central  bank  is independent  and
therefore,  the fiscal and the  monetary  authority  are separated.
The  centralized solution considers  the fiscal and the monetary  authority  to be the
same.  The  policymaker  chooses both  inflation  and  taxes to  minimize  (5) subject  to
the  Phillips  curve and  the  budget  constraint  (6).  Solving this  problem  it  is easy to
show that  the centralized  solution  is given by:
- 2t5p  *
(1  p) + p(  + 6)9
rC  - p  *
o(l+  p) + p(l  + 6)
_  p  ~
g* - 9(l  + p)  + p(1 + 6) 9 *
This  solution  indicates  that  inflation  is positive,  so it  is above the  optimal  of zero
inflation, and  output  and  government  spending  are below their  targets.  Again there
is a time consistency problem,  by which inflation is higher than  what  would be if the
government were able to commit  to low inflation.  Since there  is a need to finance the
budget,  the optimal  level of inflation  and taxes  are positive.  But.  in the centralized
solution  inflation is still  too high.
In  the  decentralized arrangement  I assume,  for simplicity,  that  the  fiscal author-
ity cares only about  inflation  and  government  spending  (not  output)  with  the same
weights as society, and  the monetary  authority  cares only about  inflation and  output
(not  g).  The fiscal authority  chooses r,  taking 7r and  hence g as given, and the mon-
etary  authority  chooses 7r subject  to the Phillips curve, taking  also r and  hence g as
given. The choices are made simultaneously.'4
"The  problem  can  be  solved  more  general  by assuming  that  both policymakers  have  the  same  loss  function  (5).
The  difference  is that  the  fiscal authority  chooses  r and  the  central  bank  vr. The  results  are  more  complicated,  but
the  implications  are  qualitatively  the  same.
16The solution  to the decentralized  arrangement  is the following:
ID  _  P  9
6(1 + p) + p
*  D  6  *
9  -69(1  + p) + p9
The characteristics  of the solution  are similar to those of the centralized  case, that  is
all of the variables are away from their  target.  More interesting,  however, is that  the
following results  can be established  (after  some tedious manipulations):
*  7C  >  7rD,  TC  <  TD,  and  gc  >  gD.  That  is, with  an  independent  central  bank
the  fiscal authority  must  rely more heavily on taxes to  finance the budget  than
on  inflation  to  finance  the  budget.  Moreover, the existence  of an  independent
central bank  imposes some discipline on the spending side too since the resulting
level of government  spending  declines.
* Welfare in the  decentralized  case is higher than  welfare in the  centralized  case.
Moreover, with  central bank independence,  welfare increases if inflation aversion,
1/6,  increases.
The  first result  highlights  the discipline effects that  an independent  central  bank.
An independent  monetary  authority  reduces the time consistency problem, producing
less inflation.  The strong  result  is the second one, by which welfare is higher in  the
decentralized  case.  Moreover, shifting  to  a  more conservative central  banker,  with
6'  <  6,  also  increases welfare.  It  has to  be  recalled,  however,  that  this  statement
refers  only  to  values close to  6.  and  it  is not  necessarily  true  that  welfare will be
maximum  with  a central bank  completely  inflation averse (6' = 0).
The model could be extended  to consider other important  issues on the sources of
inflation  and  the  role of an  independent  central  bank.  First,  one  important  reason
why do countries  rely on  inflation  to finance  the  budget  is that  their  tax  system  is
inefficient,  so a less costly way to  raise revenue is through  inflation  tax.  In terms  of
the model,  one could think  of the  budget constraints  of the government  as being g =
¢T +  7r, where 1 - 0 represents the fraction  of taxes that  are lost due  to inefficiencies.
The  inefficiencies may be  that  tax  evasion is high or simply that  the  tax  system  is
17poorly  administered.  But,  in general,  the  fiscal authority  has some control  over  0,
and  hence  an  independent  central  bank  may induce the  government  to  increase  tax
compliance. 15
Second,  an  important  aspect  where  the  decentralization  of fiscal and  monetary
authority  may help is in the case that  the  government  spending  target  is above the
social optimum.  The political  system  as well as electoral  considerations  exert  strong
pressures  on  expansions  of government  spending.  Thus,  one could  think  that  the
government's  utility  function has a target  g, that  is greater  than  the social optimum
g*.  The  previous  analysis suggests  that  an  independent  central  bank  will be  more
beneficial  in  these  circumstances,  by inducing  lower government  spending  than  the
centralized  solution.
In  summary  the  previous  discussion  suggests  that  an  independent  central  bank
may be  helpful in  achieving price stability.  Not only reduces time  consistency  prob-
lems, but  also imposes constraint  on the fiscal authority  that  help to  achieve a more
beneficial  mix of taxes  and  level of government  spending.  This  is particularly  im-
portant  in  economies where  the fiscal position  is weak since the  inability  to  set  the
inflation tax induces fiscal discipline.  One of the main goals of an independent  central
bank  is price stability,  and perhaps,  it should weigh inflation more than  what  society
is willing to  tolerate.  However, the  analysis also  suggests that  a central  bank  with
extreme  inflation  aversion may be  harmful.  It  may depress  excessively government
spending  and allow excessive output  fluctuations.  As I discuss later.  these two aspects
may have negative  impact on long-run growth.
4  Empirical  Evidence
This  section reviews and complements existing empirical  evidence on the relationship
between  inflation  and growth, and  on the effects of central bank  independence  (CBI)
on inflation  and growth.  As shown by Levine and Renelt  (1992) many of the variables
found  in the literature  as significant determinants  of economic growth are not  robust
to the conditioning  information, in the sense that  their statistical  significance depends
on which variables  are included or excluded  from the regressions.  In particular,  they
'
5 Cukierman,  Edwards  and Tabellini  (1992)  argue that  inefficiencies  in  the tax  system  may  result  from  political
and  distributional  conflicts  in the  economy.
18find that  inflation is not  robust.  Although  these findings suggest to be cautious when
interpreting  results  from cross-country  regressions-specially  when they  are estima-
tions  of loosely specified reduced forms-it  does not  necessarily imply that  a certain
(non-robust)  variable does  not  affect growth.  This  may  also be the  consequence  of
high degree of correlation  among independent  variables,  what  makes difficult to dis-
entangle  the  individual  effect of each variable.  This  section  indeed shows that  the
negative  correlation  between  inflation  and  growth  appears  to  be  robust  to  several
changes  in  specification,  which  is confirmed by  most,  but  of course  not  all,  of the
work reviewed here.
4.1  Inflation  and  Growth
The  early  empirical  work  on  inflation  and  growth  focused  on  estimating  Phillips
curve-type  relationships,  and hence, it used high frequency data  to capture  the short-
run  tradeoff  between  inflation  and  growth.  Fischer  (1983) shows, in a panel  for 53
countries and yearly data  for the periods 1961-73 and  1973-81, that  there is a negative
correlation  between  inflation and  growth even at  yearly frequency." 6
In the  growth  literature,  in turn,  most of the early  work was on growth  account-
ing, which aimed to decompose the sources of growth into growth of inputs  and factor
productivity  growth.  It  was not until  Kormendi and  Meguire (1985) that  macroeco-
nomic factors  were incorporated  as determinants  of long-run  growth  in cross-section
analysis for relatively  long periods  of time  (1950-7,7). The basic regression they  run,
and  that  has  been basically the same in later  work. is:
i-hX+  321o+e  (7)
where  'y is the  rate  of growth,  X  is a set  of independent  variables,  Y0 is the  initial
level of per-capita  GDP,  and  e is the error  term.  The  rationale  to  include  Y0 is to
control  for convergence of income across countries.  It  has been  widely documented
(see Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin,  1992) that  after  controlling  for variables  that  explain
differences in  steady  state  output  across countries  (X),  economies with  lower GDP
per capita  grow faster  than  richer ones.
An important  aspect  of estimating  (7) is whether  the  rate  of investment  should
1
6 For another  review of the  evidence  with  additional  references on time  series studies  see  Briault  (1995).
19or should not  be included  in X.  This  is of course a difficult issue which goes beyond
the scope of this  paper,  but  in terms of interpreting  the evidence it is useful to  make
the  distinction.' 7 If investment  rates  are not  included,  the effect of a variable  in X
on growth  can  be interpreted  as the  effect of that  variable  on growth  by increasing
both  the rate  of investment  and  the  efficiency of investment  (see equation  (2)).  On
the other  hand,  when the  rate  of investment  is included  in the regression,  the  effect
of inflation  on  growth  is only  due  to  increased  efficiency of investment.  Another
alternative  that  can be used to separate  the investment  and the efficiency channels is
to  run a regression like (7), but  with investment  as the dependent  variable.
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) include among the X variables the average change in
the rate  of inflation with  respect to the initial year, and concluded that  a deceleration
of inflation by 2 percent a year could increase the rate of growth by about  1 percentage
point  (p.  150).  When  they  add  investment  as a dependent  variable the  coefficient
on  inflation  declines  to  about  half of its  original  value,  which  suggests  that  high
inflation  reduces growth  by reducing,  roughly in equal proportions,  both  the  rate  of
investment  and  its efficiency. Nevertheless, this  finding is not  easy to interpret  since
it is the change, rather  than  the level, of inflation what  is being used as independent
variable.  Later on, Grier  and Tullock (1989) extend the sample to cover 1951-80 and
use five-year average panel data.  They conclude that  inflation has no effects on growth
in OECD  countries,  but  in the  rest  of the  world there  is a negative  and  significant
impact  of inflation on growth.  The coefficient found for non-OECD  countries  seems
to be,  however, surprisingly  high, since it suggests that  an increase  of 10 percentage
points  in inflation may reduce the rate  of growth by 1.6 percentage  points.
Similar  results  have  been  obtained  by  Fischer  (1991) for  a  sample  of 73 coun-
tries during  the  period  1970-85.  When  investment  is included  (regression  (5)) it is
found that  a  10 percent  inflation rate  would reduce growth by 0.5 percentage  points,
which corresponds  to  the  efficiency channel.  In  addition,  Fischer  (1991) finds that
10 percent  inflation  reduces investment  by 1.5 percentage  points  (regressions  (9) to
(11)).18  Taken  these  results  together  it  can be  conclude  that  10 percent  inflation
reduces growth  by about  0.7 percentage  points,  of which 0.5 are due  to the efficiency
17See Blomstrom,  Lipsey  and Zejan  (1993)  and  Barro and  Sala-i-Martin  (1995,  p.  433)  for further  discussions  on
this  issue.
18In addition,  regression  (5) shows  that  each percentage  point  of investment  rises growth  by 0.11  percentage  points.
20channel  and 0.2 to  the investment  channel.  Roubini and  Sala-i-Martin  (1992) using
the dataset  and the specification  of Barro  (1991), which does not  include investment
as a regressor, find that  10 percent  inflation reduces growth by 0.5 percentage  points.
They  show that  the continental  dummies used by Barro  (1991) are reduced  substan-
tially when inflation is included,  arguing that  an important  explanation  for the poor
growth  performance  of Latin  America  and  Africa is their  high inflation  rates.  East-
erly (1994) finds quantitavely  similar  results  (10 percent inflation  reduces growth  by
0.4 percentage  points),  but  he argues  that  the result  is not robust  to the  inclusion of
other  policy variables.
Fischer  (1993) extends the previous results analyzing a wide variety of indicators  of
macroeconomic policy. Regarding inflation he finds that  an inflation rate  of 10 percent
induces a total  decline in the rate  of growth of 0.3 percentage points  (regression  (39)).
Based on his estimates for the rate of growth of capital, and assuming that  the capital-
output  ratio  is 2.5, it can be concluded  that  10 percent  inflation reduces  investment
by 0.8 percentage  points,  which  in terms  of growth  would be  around  0.1 percentage
points.  Therefore, only one third of the effects of inflation on growth would be through
the investment  channel. 19
An  important  handicap  of the  empirical  analysis on inflation  and  growth  is the
endogeneity of inflation.  Consider,  for example, an economy that  is hit by a negative
supply  shock.  This shock would reduce  output,  but  also would result  in an  increase
in inflation,  and hence, the coefficient on inflation cannot be interpreted  as the effects
of inflation  on  growth.  Similarly,  consider  a  central  bank  that  follows a  constant
money  growth  policy.  A negative  shock to  the  rate  of growth  would increase  the
rate  of inflation,  and  hence the  causality  would go from growth to inflation.  Cukier-
man,  Kalaitzidakis,  Summers  and  Webb  (1993) address  this  issue by using  indices
of central  bank  independence  (discussed  in  more detail  in  the  next  subsection)  as
instruments  for  the  rate  of inflation.  They  conclude  that  there  is still  a  negative
relationship,  although  statistically  not  as  strong  as that  found  in  OLS regressions.
However, the point estimate  in their  OLS regression implies that  10 percent  inflation
1
9 Fischer  (1993)  separates  the  effects  of  inflation  on its  effects  on factor  accumulation  and  productivity  growth,
which  is  slightly  different  to the  distinction  between  investment  and efficiency  of  investment,  the  difference  being
the  capital-output  ratio.  He finds (table  9)  that  10 percent  inflation  reduces capital  accumulation  by 0.3  percentage
points,  which implies  (with  a share of capital  equal  to 0.4)  that  the capital  accumulation  effect  explains  about  0.12  of
the 0.3  reduction  of growth,  and the  remaining  is explained  by the reduction  in total  factor productivity  growth.
21reduces  growth  by 0.2 percentage  points.  but  in their  favorite instrumental  variables
regression  (regression  (4) in table  6) this  effect increases  to  0.5  percentage  points,
similar  to previous  studies.
Using  a  panel  of  122 countries  for the  three  decades  from  1960 to  1990. Barro
(1995)  analyzes  the impact  of inflation  on growth  running  the standard  regressions
and  using instruments.  The instruments  used are lagged inflation, and,  alternatively,
prior colonial status,  which is found to be highly correlated with inflation, because,  for
example, former French colonies in Africa have been in the CFA franc zone. Indices of
central  bank  independence  are found not  to be good instruments.  He finds also that
a reduction  of 10 percentage  points  in the  rate  of inflation would increase the rate  of
growth  by 0.2 to  0.3 percentage  points,  while it  would increase  the investment  rate
by  0.4 to  0.6 percentage.  The  coefficients on inflation  in  the  investment  equations
are only significant  in the  regressions that  instrument  inflation.  Assuming the usual
estimate  of the effects of investment  on growth  (0.1), it can be concluded  that  a ten
percentage  points  reduction  in  inflation  increase  growth  by 0.2 or 0.3 out  of which
roughly  0.05 are due to  the investment  channel.
Another  aspect of the relationship between inflation and growth is the possibility of
nonlinearities.  Levine and  Zervos (1993) confirm Levine and  Renelt  (1992) findings
that  inflation  is  not  a  robust  determinant  of  long-run  growth.  The  former  paper
analyzes  the  possibilities  of nonlinearities  by  distinguishing  between  high  and  low
inflation and find that  results are strongly  influenced by some outliers.  Fischer (1993)
also  separates  inflation  in low (less than  15 percent),  medium  (15 to  40) and  high
(above 40),  and  finds that  the coefficient is declining  when going from  low to  high
inflation.  This is not surprising, since increasing inflation from 10 to 20 percent  should
be more damaging  for growth than  going from 180 to 190 percent.  This suggests that
inflation should enter nonlinearly in the regression, such as the log of inflation or other
transformation  that  reduces the impact  of high inflation  rates.  Indeed, De Gregorio
(1993) finds  that  the  coefficient is more stable  across different  inflationary  regimes
when inflation  is introduced  in log form.
The  issue  about  non linearities  of the  relationship  between  inflation  and  growth
has  been  carefully explored  in  Sarel (1995).  He estimates  a  regression  such as  (7),
with  inflation  in  a log form.  Sarel argues  that  omitting  this  break could  induce  an
underestimation  of the  effects of inflation on growth.  The  results show that  there  is
22a break  at an inflation  rate of 8%. Above that  break the effect of inflation on growth
is significant,  robust  and  quite large.  For inflation below 8% it is found that  it does
not have effects on growth,  and at most. a small positive effect.  The coefficient found
when this break is considered indicates that  doubling the rate of inflation with reduce
the  rate  of growth  by 1.7 percentage  points.  When the  break  is not  considered  the
effects declines to a third.  However, and as it is argued below, low-inflation countries
include  OECD  countries  and  several low-growth African  countries.  Therefore,  this
combination  is  what  may downplay  the  effects of low inflation  on  growth.  When
industrialized  countries  are considered separately, there  is still a negative correlation
between inflation  and  growth.
Another  study  looking at  nonlinearities  is Bruno  and  Easterlv  (1995), who  use
a nonparametric  approach  to  study  the effects of high inflation  (-'inflation crises"),
above  40%,  and  growth,  conclude  that  inflation  crises lead  to  sharp  reductions  in
growth,  and  recovers strongly  after stabilization.  Moreover, these results  support  the
view that  stabilizing  high inflation does not  entail output  losses.
Latin  America  has been the region with the highest  inflation rates, and  where  we
could expect  to find the stronger  effects. Indeed, Cardoso and Fishlow (1991) examine
the correlation  between  inflation and growth and find that  a reduction  of inflation of
inflation  of 20 percent  would increase growth by 0.4 percentage  points.  De Gregorio
(1992,  1993),  estimating  regressions  as  (7) for a  panel  data  of  12 Latin  American
countries  during  the  1950-85 period.  finds that  reducing  the  rate  of inflation  by  a
half increases  GDP  per  capita  growth  by 0.4 percent.  This  magnituide is sizable  if
we consider that  average  rate  of per  capita  growth  in the  sample is 1.3 percent  per
year and the average rate  of inflation is 34 percent.20 In addition.  De Gregorio  (1993)
finds  that  inflation  has  no  effects on  investment,  concluding  that  inflation  affects
the productivity  of investment  rather  than  its level.  Cardoso  (1994) also finds weak
evidence for the correlation  between investment  and  an index of economic instability
constructed  on the basis of the debt ratio,  the rate  of inflation andl the variability  of
the real exchange  rate.
There  is some evidence, however, that  reports  a negative relationship  between in-
vestment  and inflation.  Pindyck  and Solimano (1993) report  a statistically  significant
2 0The  results  are  similar  for the average  inflation  rate, the  variance  of inflation  and  the  rate of money  growth.
23relationship  between investment  and  inflation for a sample of high inflation  countries
(Argentina,  Bolivia, Brazil,  Chile, Israel and  Mexico) but  the value of the coefficient
is very small.  The highest coefficient they find is -0.00016, which implies that  a going
from  zero to  1000 percent  inflation  per  year  would reduce  investment  by only  0.2
percentage  points.  They find, however, an economically significant effect in a sample
of OECD  countries.  where  a  10 percent  inflation would reduce  total  investment  by
0.9 percentage  points.21  Corbo  and  Rojas  (1993) find that  Latin  American  countries
with inflation  above 50 percent  have 1.3 percentage  points  of lower investment  than
those  countries  with  low inflation.  Their  coefficients are,  however, only  marginally
significant.  They  also run  separately  equations  for growth  and  investment  and  find
that  reducing  inflation by 10 percentage  points  increases both  growth  and the rate of
investment  by  1 percentage  point.  Therefore,  their  results  confirm that  most  of the
effects of inflation on growth are due to a decline in efficiency.
There  are some studies  that  do not find robust  effects of inflation  on growth.  As
already  mentioned,  Levine  and  Zervos  (1993),  using  World  Bank  data  on  output
growth,  find that  the relationship  is not robust.  Moreover, they argue that  Nicaragua
and  Uganda  are two outliers  that  change dramatically  the  results.  McClandess  and
Weber  (1994) examining  the  partial  correlations  between  inflation  and  growth  in  a
sample  of 110 countries,  with  all data  taken  from IFS  for the  period  1960-90,  find
that  they  are  not  correlated.  One  explanation  for the  lack  of correlation  of some
studies  offered by Bruno  and  Easterly  (1995) is that  the  declining  path  of growth
during  inflation crises is offset by the strong  recovery after stabilization.
In  the  remaining  of this  section  I  complement  the  empirical  evidence  reviewed
previously.  Figures  1 and  2 present simple cross-section correlations  of inflation, and
growth and investment,  respectively.  The figures show that  there is indeed a negative
correlation  between  inflation and  growth, and  a weaker negative  correlation  between
infiation  and  investinent.  In tables  1 and  2 I present  cross-country  regressions  for
infiation  and  growth.  I use the  data  from  Barro  (1991) and  completed  them  with
inflation  from  IFS.  Based  on the  previous  discussion  I use the  log of the  inflation
rate.  Following Levine and  Zervos (1993) I exclude Nicaragua  and Uganda  from the
sample. 22 There  is some evidence of heteroscedasticity,  thus  the standard  deviations
21This  is of the order  of magnitude  of the  findings of Fischer  (1991,  1993).
221n addition  I experimented  with  the  log  of 1+inflation  and the results  do not  change  significantly.
24are computed  using White's  robust  procedure.
Regression  1.1 show that  there  is a significant negative correlation  between  infla-
tion  and  growth, after  controlling  for the  traditional  variables.  Since the  dependent
variable  is the  log of inflation,  the  parameter  implies  that  reducing  inflation  by 10
percent  (not  percentage  points)  would increase  growth by 0.06 percent.  That  is, re-
ducing inflation  to  half of its  value  (the  average  inflation rate  is 15 percent)  would
increase  growth  by 0.4 [-0.057xlog(O.5)] percentage  points. 23 If the  regression  were
run  with  linear  inflation the  effect of inflation would still be significant, but  weaker,
since a reduction  of inflation by 10 percent  would increase growth by 0.2 percentage
points.  Regression  1.2 separates  inflation in high and low inflation, using 20 percent
as  a  cutoff.  The  results  show  a  similar  coefficient and  they  indicate  that  is  high
inflation  what  is harmful  for growth.
In  contrast  to  the  regressions  that  separate  the  sample  between  high-  and  low-
inflation  countries,  when the  equation  is constrained  for a sample  of industrialized
countries  (regression  1.5) the  negative effect of inflation and  growth  remains  strong,
and  the  coefficient declines only  slightly.  This  apparent  contradiction  may be  ex-
plained  by the  interactions  of inflation  with  the  other  explanatory  variables.  But
mainly, this is due to the fact that  low-inflation combines low-inflation and low-growth
African countries with moderate-growth  and low-inflation industrialized  countries.  Fi-
nally, the effect of inflation on growth in developing countries  appears to  be stronger
(regression  1.6).
Regressions  1.3 and  1.4 reproduce  the first  ones with  the addition  of the  rate  of
investment  as dependent  variable.  The  coefficient on investment  is significant,  but
the inclusion of this variable does not change significantly the coefficients on inflation.
According  to  the results,  at  least  three  quarters  of the effects of inflation  on growth
is through  the efficiency channel.
In table  2 I check the  robustness  of the  results.  First,  I do not  use White's  cor-
rection,  despite  the evidence of heteroscedasticity,  since I found  that  the  t-statistics
tend  in general  to  experience  a slight  increase,  and  thus,  I use  the  approach  most
negative  for the  robustness  of inflation.  Second,  I add  the  index of number  of rev-
olutions  and  coups per  year  from  Barro  (1991), since it appears  also  to  reduce  the
231n  De  Gregorio  (1993)  the  coefficient  is -0.008  and  in  Sarel  (1995)  -0.025 when  the  break  is considered  and  -0.008
otherwise.
25strength  of the  effects of inflation. 24 And  third,  I  exclude  Argentina,  Bolivia,  and
Peru,  three  countries that  have had high inflation rates and poor growth performance
and  could be  driving the  result  in the  sample  of developing countries.  The  results
show the  revolutions  and  coups reduces by  almost  a quarter  the  effects of inflation
in growth.  More interesting  is the fact that  the exclusion of Argentina,  Bolivia,  and
Peru increases  the value and the significance of the coefficients in the full sample  and
in developing countries.25
The  investment  channel  is further  explored  in  table  3.  The  regressions  use the
same regressors  as in the case of the growth rates.  It is interesting  to verify that  in all
specification  inflation  is not  significant.  Several  other  experiments  were performed,
such as excluding the variables that  were not significant, splitting  the sample between
low and  high  inflation,  adding growth and  political  variables  as regressors, etc.  The
only  regression  were I  found  a  significant  coefficient  was when  investment  in  low
inflation  countries  was run  with inflation  as the  only regressor.  The coefficient was
-0.07 and  the t-statistic  -2.8, but  once indicators  of schooling or the initial GDP  were
added  the  coefficient on inflation became  insignificant.  This  coefficient is similar  to
that  found in other studies.  The results suggest that  the difference with other  studies
that  have found  a significant coefficient of inflation  on investment  equations  is that
they do not  include variables like the initial  level of human capital  or the initial  level
of output.
The  result  reported  in  this  paper  suggest  that  inflation  have negative  effects on
growth.  This  effect holds for a  subsample  of low-inflation industrialized  countries.
When  analyzing  developing countries  separately  the results  indicate  that  is high in-
flation  what  matters  for growth.  Finally, most  of the effect of inflation on growth  are
through  the efficiency channel.
4.2  Central  bank  independence  and  macroeconomic  performance
As discussed  in the previous section theory predicts  that  the  more independent  (and
inflation  averse)  is a central  bank  the lower the  inflation rate  will be.  Furthermore,
if low inflation  rates  lead to faster  growth, one should  expect  a negative  association
24Other  indices  of political  instability  were  added  to  the  regressions,  but  the  only  significant  one  was the  index  of
revolutions  and  coups.
251n  regressions  2.1  and  2 5 the  use of White's  correction  would make  inflation  to  be  significant  at  5 percent  level.
26between  central  bank  independence  and  a  positive  one between  C'BI and  growth.  I
begin by reviewing the evidence on CBI and inflation and growth for OECD countries,
which has been the  focus of most  of the existing empirical studies,  and then  I review
the evidence for developing countries.
The first issue that  must  be addressed is how to measure  CBI. Many authors  have
tackled this difficult task,  most notably Bade and Parkin  (1982), Alesina (1988), Grilli,
Masciardano  and Tabellini  (1991) [GMT], Cukierman  (1992), Cukierman,  Webb and
Neyapti (1992) [CWN], and Alesina and Summers (1993) [AS]. These studies, with the
addition  of De Long and  Summers  (1992), and  Cukierman,  Kalaitzidakis,  Summers
and  Webb  (1993) have  analyzed the  relationship  between  CBI  and  macroeconomic
performance.
CBI  can be  measured  by evaluating  the extent  to which the law gives the central
bank  independence  to set the policy objectives.  This is what  has been broadly called
"political"  or  "legal"  independence  and  consists  in  examining  the  influence of the
government  in appointing  the governor and the board,  the length of the appointments,
the final objectives of the central bank, and other legal characteristics  stated  in central
banks'  charters.  Most of the  measures of legal and  political  independence  has been
constructed  for industrialized  countries.
Another  aspect  of CBI, emphasized first by GMT, is the "economic" independence
of the central bank.  This is defined as the independence of the central bank in choosing
monetary  policv  instruments.  In particular.  the influence of the government  on how
much  to  borrow  from  the  central  bank,  for example  whether  the  government  has
an  automatic  credit  facility  and  whether  it  is  at  market  interest  rates.  Economic
independence  is also defined in terms of the instruments  under  control of the central
bank,  such as control on the discount rate  or banking  supervision.
Table  4 presents  the  most  widely used  indices of CBI,  the  inflation  rate  during
the  period  1960-85,  and  the rate  of growth  of per  capita  GDP  for the  same period
for  a  sample  of  OECD  countries.  The  GMTAS  index  is the  sum  of the  economic
and  political  independence  indices constructed  by  GMT  and  later  extended  by AS.
The other  index  corresponds  to the legal index constructed  by CWN as reported  in
Cukierman  (1992, table  19.3).  Both  measures  are highly  correlated,  except  for the
cases of Norway and  Japan,  which according  to  CWN have low legal independence,
while the GMTAS  index puts  them  around  the  mean.
27Figures  3 and  4 replicate  the negative correlation  between both  measures  of CBI
and inflation found in most of previous studies.  This relationship  appears  to be robust
to changes in the specification  as well as alternative  measures of CBI.
The  relationship  between  CBI  and  growth  is less clear.  Figure  3 plots  the  rate
of GDP  per  capita  growth  and  the  GMTAS index of CBI. As can be  seen from  the
figure there  is basically no relationship  between growth and  CBI. However, as shown
by De Long and Summers  (1992), once rates  of growth are controlled  by initial  GDP,
there  is a positive  relationship  between  growth  and  CBI.  Figure  4 uses  the  partial
scatterplot  proposed  by De Long and  Summers  (1992).  The  vertical  axis measures
the  residual  from  a  regression  of the  rate  of growth  on  GDP  per  capita  in  1960,
that  is, the component  of growth that  is not explained by convergence.  Similarly, the
horizontal  axis measures the orthogonal  component  of CBI on initial GDP. The figure
shows a positive  correlation  between  CBI and  growth.  The  underlying  regression is
the  following:
Growth  6.58  - 2.907 log GDP60  +  0.344CBI  (8)
(9.62)  (-6.19)  (1.86)
R2 =  0.75, N obs. =  16, and  t-statistics  in parenthesis.
It is important  to  note, however, that  the coefficient on growth  is marginally  sig-
nificant, and it is difficult to make a strong case for a positive and  robust  correlation
between CBI and growth.  The results  are also sensitive to the classification of Japan.
A similar  result  has  been found  by  Cukierman,  I;alaitzidakis,  Summers  and  Webb
(1993), who find that  CBI has no significant effect on growth in industrialized  coun-
tries.
Several reasons  can explain  the lack of (or the weak) correlation  between growth
and  CBI.  First,  at  low levels of inflation,  such as  those  of industrialized  countries,
inflation  may have little  effects on growth,  and  hence, an independent  central  bank
may  have limited  role in fostering  growth.  Second, the  low inflation  record  may be
at  the expense of high output  variability,  which may be harmful  for growth.
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that,  in contrast  to the theoretical  predictions,
CBI is uncorrelated  with  output  variability.  Models such as Rogoff (1985) predicts
that  an  independent  central  bank  produces  less inflation,  but  at  the cost  of higher
variability  of output.  The fact that  CBI leads to lower inflation without  costs in terms
28of output  growth or instability  has led to GMT to argue that  "having an independent
central  bank  is like having a free lunch;  there  are benefits  but  no apparent  costs  in
terms  of macroeconomic performance."
Debelle  and Fischer  (1994) have revisited  this  issue, and conclude-by  comparing
US and  Germany, and  then extending  the  analysis to  a group of OECD  countries-
that  countries with more independent  central banks tend to have greater  output  losses
during  disinflations  and  their sacrifice ratios  (output  loss per  percentage  point of in-
flation  reduction)  are larger.  Walsh  (1994) and  Fischer  (1995) have also  presented
evidence showing that  the  sacrifice ratio  is higher the  higher is the  degree  of inde-
pendence  of the  central  bank.  He  argues  that  independent  central  banks  produce
lower inflation, and,  most  theories predict,  the lower the inflation rate  the flatter  the
Phillips  curve.  Therefore,  in low inflation economies it is more costly to reduce infla-
tion.  In  this  respect,  there  would not  be such a free lunch and  independent  central
banks  would  not  have a  credibility  bonus  that  would  allow them  to  fight  inflation
without  increased  output  losses.  Excessive weight in inflation  prevention  could  be
detrimental.
This  evidence, however, is based  on sacrifice ratios-that  is the  output  loss asso-
ciated  with  a reduction  of on percentage point of inflation-,  and  analogously  to  the
discussion on inflation and growth, it should not  be surprising that  it is less costly to
reduce  inflation from 10 to 9 percent  than  to reduce it from 3 to  2 percent.  It  would
be more appropriate  to use some form of standardized  sacrifice ratios.  For example,
as reported  by Fischer  (1995), using the sacrifice ratios  from Ball (1993) for 28 dis-
inflations  in OECD  countries  for  the  period  1960-90 and  using the  GMTAS  index
of central  bank  independence,  it  is found  that  a  regression of the sacrifice ratio  on
the GMTAS index yield a positive  coefficient with a t-statistic  of 3.7. This  indicates
that  an  increase  in central  bank  independence  increases  (in a statistically  significant
sense) the sacrifice ratio.  However if the sacrifice ratio  is redefined as the output  loss
per  one  percent  decline in  the inflation  rate26, the  regression on the  GMTAS  index
yields a positive  coefficient, but  statistically  insignificant with  a t-statistic  of 1.17.
Furthermore,-even  when sacrifice ratios  could be  greater  in countries  with  inde-
2 6The  usual  sacrifice ratio is defined  as S =  A(-y)/Anr,  where the numerator  is the sum  of output  deviations
from  full employment,  and  the  denominator  the  decline  in inflation.  The  redefinition  proposed  in the  text  is  S'
Et  - y)/(A7r/,ro),  or analogously  S' = S  x 7o.
29pendent  central  banks,  as a result  of a flatter  Phillips  curve, it  is not  clear that  is
optimal  to  have zero sacrifice ratio  (or vertical  Phillips  curve).  It  could be  possible
that  precisely  because  the sacrifice ratio  is high,  the  inflation rate  is low.  Actually,
this issue boils down to what is the optimal slope of the Phillips curve in the presence
of dynamic  inconsistency,  issue that  has not  been resolved.
The  evidence  for developing  countries  is more  scarce,  but  recently  Cukierman,
Kalaitzidakis,  Summers  and  Webb  (1993) have provided  a  detailed  analysis  of the
relationship  between  CBI and macroeconomic  performance  in developing  countries.
Analysis of CBI among developing countries show that  indices of "legal independence"
bear  little  relation  to  the  actual  independence  of central  banks.  For  this  reason
CWN  have computed  the rate  of turnover  of governors of central  banks.  This  index
seems  to  perform  better  in  proxying  actual  independence.  In developing  countries
the correlation  between turnover  rates  and legal independence  is very low.
An additional  problem  in  developing countries  is that  inflation  rates  are  highly
variable,  including  several cases of extreme inflation.  CWN suggest to look at 7r/(1 +
-7r),  which corresponds  to the rate of depreciation  of real balance.27 Figure  5 presents
the simple correlation  between turnover rates and inflation for a sample of developing
countries.  The figure shows a strong  positive correlation,  but  it also reveals that  this
is to  a large  extent  due to  Argentina,  the country  with  the  highest turnover  rate  of
central  bank  governors,  and  the  highest inflation  rate.  One could argue  that  Costa
Rica may be an outlier  too since it has relatively  low inflation and hligh turnover.
Table 5 presents  a more formal statistical  analysis between CBI and  inflation.  For
the whole  sample of countries legal independence  does not  significantly affects infla-
tion.  Only when the subsample of OECD countries  is considered  the results  coincide
with  those  of CWN  that  show legal independence  and  not turnover  rates  are signifi-
cant  determinants  of inflation.  In contrast,  the regressions show that  for developing
countries  turnover  rates  are positively  associated  with  inflation,  that  is, the  higher
the rate  of turnover  the  higher the  rate  of inflation.  Several regressions analyze  the
case of outliers,  in particular  Argentina.  In the whole sample, the coefficient declines
from 0.37 to 0.21 but  is still significant.  In contrast,  and  contrary  to CWN, the coef-
27At the  end  of a  period  with  inflation  equal  to  7r real  value  of an  initial  $1 is  1/(1  +  7r). Thus  the  depreciation  is
- 1/(1  +  7r). One  can  also  look  at the  log  of the  inflation  rate.  For  convenience  I will call  indistinctly  inflation  to
both  7r and  ir/(l  + 7r).
30ficient becomes insignificant  when Argentina is excluded.  The last regression of table
5 shows that  even when Costa  Rica is also excluded the coefficient is insignificant.
Comparing  the  results  of table  5 and  those  of CWN,  we can  conclude  that  an
important  part  of the  correlation  they find is due to  Argentina.  However, the results
are not  exactly  comparable  since they  run panel regressions  that  allow for more ob-
servations,  and  hence, more precise estimations.  The  point  estimates  of Table  5 are
similar  to  those  of CWN  and  a reasonable  value for the  true  coefficient on turnover
rates  is about  0.2.  This  value implies that  reducing  the  turnover  rate  from 0.5 to
0.25 (that  is, increasing  the  average duration  of the central  bank  governor from  2 to
4 years)  would reduce the depreciation  rate by 0.05.  For an economy with  25 percent
inflation,  a reduction  in T/(1 + 7) of 0.05 would be equivalent  to reduce the inflation
rate  to  18 percent.
Regarding  growth,  figure 6 displays  the  simple  correlation  between  growth  and
turnover  rates.  Again,  this  simple correlation  shows that  Argentina  plays an impor-
tant  role inl making  the relationship  negative.  Regressions results  reproducing  tables
1 and 2 with turnover  rates instead of inflation (not reported  here) show no significant
correlation  between  growth  and  CBI among developing countries.  This  result  holds
not  only  for  the  simple  correlation,  but  also  after  controlling  for initial  (in  1960)
primary  and  secondary  school  enrollment  ratios,  and  per-capita  GDP.  The  lack  of
correlation  I find here is a direct consequence from the fact that  I do not find a strong
correlation  between  inflation  and  turnover  rates.  As in the  case of inflation,  the  re-
sults here also contrasts  with those of Cukierman,  I;alaitzidakis.  Summers  and Webb
(1993), who find  a negative  correlation  between CBI and  growth  among developing
countries.
5  Conclusions
This paper  has reviewed the theory and evidence of inflation and  growth and  the role
of central  banks.  There are many channels through  which inflation affects growth and
in this  paper it has been emphasized the difference between the effects of inflation on
the rate  of investment  and  on the efficiency of investment.  Since theory and evidence
suggest  that  inflation  is harmful  for growth  an  effective central  bank  may play  an
important  role not  only in  providing macroeconomic  stability  in  the short  run,  but
31also by its implications  for long-run  growth.
The theory  on central  bank  independence  suggests that  an the  more independent
and inflation-averse  is a central bank the lower the rate of inflation.  But,  going to the
extreme of a central bank  that  only cares about  inflation is not the optimum.  First,  it
requires to complement  with the fiscal authority  in setting  the optimal  mix of taxes.
Second, and perhaps  more important,  a central bank  with  the only mandate  of price
stability  may  generate  excessive output  fluctuations.  In  the  context  of this  paper
the  next  natural  question  is what  are  the  long-run  consequences  of higher  output
variability.  This  is an issue that  requires further  research.
The evidence on inflation and growth presented here and in other studies  indicates
that  inflation has negative effects on growth.  This evidence passes several robustness
tests:  it  is robust  across datasets,  regions, endogeneity problems,  etc.  There  are, of
course,  some  exceptions.  Quantitatively,  these  effects could account  up  to  0.4-0.5
percentage  points  of faster growth for a reduction  of 10 percentage  points  in the rate
of inflation.28 The evidence also broadly suggests that  most of the effects (at least two
thirds)  of inflation on growth operate  through  the efficiency of investment,  or similarly
through  the rate  of productivity  growth.  The effects of inflation on investment  rates
are less clear.  In Latin  America it is difficult to find an effect of a relevant magnitude.
For larger cross-section of countries,  some authors  have found a negative  correlation
between investment  and inflation, but it does not seem as robust  or as strong as those
found for the direct  relationship  between inflation and growth.
If inflation  is bad  for growth  why is there  inflation?  The  most  accepted  answer,
not  only  by academics  but  also  by  policymakers,  would be  because  it  is costly  to
reduce  it.  Therefore,  one  can  conclude  that  while there  is a  negative  relationship
between inflation  and growth  in the long run,  this relationship  is positive in the short
run.  There  is no empirical  evidence disentangling  the short  and  long  run  effects of
inflation, but  it is puzzling that  even at yearly frequencies Fischer  (1983, 1993) finds
a negative correlation  between inflation  and growth.
What  do we learn from the  evidence on inflation and  growth  with  respect  to  the
theory?  The  weak relationship  between  investment  and  inflation  suggests  that  the
tax  imposed  on investors  cash  holdings  and  the  uncertainty  effects of inflation  on
28 This  is valid for  "average" countries,  that  is, with  inflation  rates less  than  20 or 30  percent  per year.
32investment  may not  be very important.  The fact that  inflation affects growth  mainly
through  the  allocation  (rather  than  the  volume) of resources  is not  easy  to  explain
using  traditional  models.  As discussed  in section  2, a decline in employment  could
explain  a decline in the  efficiency of investment.  However, the evidence of inflation
on employment  is weak.  De Gregorio  (1993) finds no significant correlation  between
inflation  and employment,  and Fischer  (1993) finds no relationship  between  inflation
and the rate  of growth of employment.  Cooley and Hansen (1989), however, report  a
negative  correlation  between average  inflation and employment  rates for a sample  of
23 countries  during  the period  1976-85.  Nevertheless,  a look at their  graph  suggests
that  this  correlation  may not  be  robust.  Furthermore,  Gomme (1993) calibrates  a
real  business cycle  model with  endogenous  growth,  where employment  fluctuations
drive most  of the results,  and  finds that  increasing  inflation,  in an economy such  as
the U.S.,  by 50 percent  would reduce growth  by only 0.2 percent  per year,  which is
small compared  to the econometric  evidence reported  here.  Therefore, it is necessary
to explore further  other channels through  which inflation may have allocative  effects.
Perhaps,  explanations  along the extensions to  the neoclassical model or through  the
functioning  of credit  markets  (Section  2.2 and  2.4), may  help to  our  better  under-
standing  of the relationship  between inflation and growth.  The literature  on inflation,
distributional  conflicts and political  factors may also provide additional  insights.
The  existing  evidence  on  the  affects  of CBI  on  inflation  and  growth  seems  to
suggests the following: CBI is an important  determinant  of inflation and its impact on
growth  is mostly significant in developing countries.  The correlations  reported  here,
however, suggest that  those results  may not be robust.  The most robust  result  seems
to be the effects of CBI on inflation among industrialized  countries.  The difficulties to
have reliable indicators  for developing countries  prevent  a more accurate  assessment
of the  effects of CBI on macroeconomic  performance.
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39Table  1: Growth  and  Inflation:  Cross-Section  (1960-85)
Dependent  variable:  Growth GDP  per  capita  1960-85
Indep.  Variable  Coefficient (t- statistics)
Regression  No.:  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.6
Sample  All  All  All  All  Indust.  Develop.
countries  countries  countries  countries  countries  countries
Inflationa  -0.0057  -0.0051  -0.0042  -0.0071
(-2.86)  (-2.81)  (-2.43)  (-2.75)
High Inflationa  -0.0050  -0.0040
(>20%)  (-2.23)  (-1.94)
Low Inflationa  0.0038  0.0024
(<20%)  (0.93)  (0.64)
Investment  0.091  0.093
Rate  (2.85)  (2.93)
SEC60b  0.032  0.032  0.021  0.021  0.016  0.041
(2.90)  (2.86)  (1.93)  (1.89)  (2.86)  (2.08)
PRIM6Ob  0.040  0.040  0.029  0.029  0.009  0.039
(5.18)  (5.28)  (3.65)  (3.76)  (1.07)  (4.05)
Government  -0.147  -0.149  -0.150  -0.154  -0.036  -0.179
Consumption  (-4.17)  (-4.21)  (-4.76)  (-4.67)  (-1.25)  (-4.41)
log(initial  GDP)  -0.016  -0.016  -0.016  -0.016  -0.026  -0.015
(-4.20)  (-4.06)  (-4.76)  (-4.67)  (-6.33)  (-3.10)
R2  0.48  0.48  0.55  0.55  0.72  0.51
No. obs.  84  84  84  84  21  63
Standard  errors  computed  using  White's  robust  procedure.
a  Log of the  inflation  rates.
b SEC60  (PRIM60):  Secondary  (primary)  school enrollment  ratio  in  1960.
40Table  2: Growth and Inflation:  Subsamples and Outliers
Dependent  variable:  Growth GDP  per capita  1960-85
Indep.  Variable  Coefficient (t- statistics)
Regression  No.:  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.4  2.5
Sample  All  All  Develop.  Develop.  Develop.
countries  countriesc  countriesc  countries  countries'
Inflation'  -0.0036  -0.0047  -0.0061
(-1.68)  (-2.02)  (-2.25)
High Inflationa  -0.0046  -0.0053
(>20%)  (-1.42)  (-1.63)
Low Inflationa  0.0043  0.0042
(<20%)  (0.79)  (0.77)
SEC60b  0.030  0.029  0.036  0.037  0.035
(2.58)  (2.52)  (1.63)  (1.66)  (1.57)
PRIM60b  0.036  0.036  0.036  0.037  0.037
(4.89)  (4.83)  (3.85)  (3.80)  (3.84)
Government  -0.155  -0.165  -0.206  -0.190  -0.208
Consumption  (-4.85)  (-5.12)  (-5.21)  (-4.79)  (-5.18)
log(initial  GDP)  -0.017  -0.018  -0.018  -0.017  -0.018
(-5.28)  (-5.50)  (-4.41)  (-4.08)  (-4.32)
Revolutions  -0.019  -0.028  -0.028  -0.018  -0.029
and  Coups  (-2.42)  (-3.02)  (-2.77)  (-2.08)  (-5.18)
R2 0.52  0.58  0.57  0.54  0.57
No. obs.  84  81  60  63  60
a  Log of the  inflation  rates.
b SEC60  (PRIM60):  Secondary  (primary)  school  enrollment  ratio  in 1960.
c  Excludes  Argentina,  Bolivia  and Peru
41Table 3: Investment  and  Inflation:  Cross-Section  (1960-85)
Dependent  variable:  Investment  Rate  1960-85
Indep.  Variable  Coefficient (t-  statistics)
Regression  No.:  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.5  3.6
Sample  All  All  All  Indust.  Develop.  High inf.
countries  countries  countries  countries  countries  countries
Inflationa  -0.016  -0.007  -0.009  -0.009  0.012
(-1.32)  (-0.76)  (-0.55)  (-0.92)  (0.78)
High Inflationa  -0.010
(>20%)  (-0.98)
Low Inflationa  0.015
(<20%)  (0.94)
SEC60b  0.123  0.123  0.064  0.188  0.065
(2.13)  (2.11)  (0.84)  (2.35)  (0.78)
PRIM60b  0.118  0.117  -0.006  0.103  0.039
(4.53)  (4.58)  (-0.09)  (3.87)  (0.17)
Government  0.050  -0.328  0.121
Consumption  (0.35)  (-1.88)  (0.75)
log(initial  GDP)  -0.002  -0.002  -0.030  0.004  0.051
(-0.15)  (-0.11)  (-0.88)  (0.23)  (1.46)
R  2  0.02  0.54  0.54  0.13  0.46  0.58
No.  obs.  84  84  84  21  63  13
Standard  errors computed using White's robust procedure.
a  Log of the inflation rates.
b SEC60 (PRIM60): Secondary (primary) school enrollment ratio in 1960.
42Table  4:  CBI,  Inflation  and  Growth  in  OECD  countries
| GMTAS  I CWN  |Inflation  I Growth_|
Australia  2  0.31  6.8  2.1
Belgium  2  0.19  5.6  3.2
Canada  2.5  0.46  5.8  2.8
Denmark  2.5  0.47  7.9  2.7
France  2  0.28  7.4  3.2
Germany  4  0.66  3.8  2.9
Italy  1.75  0.22  9.9  3.3
Japan  2.5  0.16  6.5  5.8
Netherlands  2.5  0.42  5.5  2.6
Norway  2  0.14  7.0  3.7
New Zealand  1  0.  27  8.9  1.4
Spain  1.5  0.21  11.0  3.9
Sweden  2  0.27  7.1  2.6
Switzerland  4  0.68  4.  2  1.8
United  Kingdom  2  0.31  8.6  2.2
United  States  3.5  0.51  5.4  2.1
Sources: Alesina and Summers (1993). Cuikierman  (1993), IFS anid
Summers and Heston (1991).
43Table  5: Regressions  Results  for Inflation
||aSample  |  Legal  Turnover  R2 n. obs.
S  Indepen.  Rate
B  Dependent  Variable:  7(1  + 7r)
All  0.076  0.368  0.29  51
Counitries  (0.66)  (4.35)
All  0.368  0.28  52
Coulntries  (4.42)
All  0.213  0.08  51
Coutitries'1 (2.09)
OECD  -0.066  -0.003  0.42  15
C  Countries  (-2.278)  (-0.03)
Developing  0.246  0.394  0.20  32
|  C0ounrtries  (1.09)  (3.23)
Developing  0.394  0.26  33
Counltries  (3.27)
lDeveloping t  0.241  0.06  31
C'ointriesb  i  (1.34)
.-satistics  in  parenthesis.
tExcluding  Argentina.
'Excluding  Argentina  and  Costa  Rica.
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